This paper presents results from a randomized …eld experiment to test for the importance of limited commitment (due to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intrahousehold risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment followed 142 daily income earners and their spouses for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock (equivalent to about 1.5 days'income for men and 1 week's income for women). This paper has 2 main results. First, since the experimental payments are random, they allow for a direct test of allocative Pareto e¢ -ciency. I reject e¢ ciency, as male private goods expenditures are sensitive to the receipt of the payment. Second, the experiment varied the level of intra-household correlation in the experimental payments between couples. I …nd that women send bigger transfers to their husbands when shocks are independent or negatively correlated, a result consistent with the presence of limited commitment. I …nd no di¤erence in transfers for men, likely because the shocks were too small to cause the limited commitment constraint to bind for them.
Introduction
Individuals in developing countries are subject to considerable risk but most lack access to formal mechanisms that would allow them to insure themselves against unexpected income shocks.
Instead, households often use informal systems of gifts and loans to pool idiosyncratic risk. While these informal networks do provide some protection against shocks, they also face substantial problems of asymmetric information and payment enforceability, and existing evidence suggests that inter-household risk sharing networks are rarely, if ever, e¢ cient (Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) .
In the absence of e¤ective inter-household insurance mechanisms, a natural place for individuals to choose to cope with risk is within the household. Though such arrangements will be somewhat limited because income shocks are likely to be correlated within households, whether these arrangements are e¤ective in insuring the idiosyncratic risk that remains is an important question. In particular, since information and enforcement are presumably better within a single household than between di¤erent households, intra-household insurance is the "best hope" for an informal insurance scheme to overcome information and payment enforceability problems.
If risk is not insured even within the household, despite the substantial incentives household members should have to insure each other in the absence of other risk-coping strategies, then micro insurance or other interventions that impact the ability of individuals to cope with risk will likely have large welfare impacts. This paper presents results from a …eld experiment in Kenya designed to test whether intrahousehold risk-sharing arrangements are e¢ cient and, if not, whether limited commitment is a partial explanation for observed behavior. The experiment followed 142 married couples for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock, equivalent to roughly 1.5 days'income for men and 1 week's income for women. As these shocks are, by de…nition, random, transitory, and idiosyncratic, the experimental design makes it possible to test directly for allocative e¢ ciency, by comparing the di¤erence in the responsiveness of individual private consumption between weeks in which an individual receives the shock himself and weeks in which his spouse receives the shock. If the household pools risk e¢ ciently, increases in private consumption should be the same for both types of shocks. 1 However, I …nd that husbands increase their expenditures on privately consumed goods in weeks in which they receive the shock but do not change their expenditures in weeks in which their wives receive the shock, a rejection of Pareto e¢ ciency. In contrast, private expenditures by women are not sensitive to the shocks. Women also transfer part of the shock to their husbands, but men do not transfer any to their wives.
Both spouses save the majority of the shock, though I am unable to test whether the savings should be thought of as individual or joint household savings. Since the test in this paper is for relatively small shocks, the failure of intra-household risk sharing is likely to be even more pronounced for bigger shocks such as poor harvest or major illness.
The experiment was designed to also explore the possibility that limited commitment caused by incomplete contract enforceability is a partial explanation for this ine¢ ciency. Under limited commitment, an individual cannot be legally forced to make the Pareto e¢ cient transfer to his insurance partner, even if, ex ante, he had agreed to; instead, insurance arrangements must be self-enforcing. For this reason, non-zero transfers are sustainable only if partners can punish each other for failing to make payments by, for instance, terminating or limiting the insurance relationship. Given such a threat, an individual balances the current utility loss from making a transfer against the long-term expected utility gain from insurance, a constraint which implies that only those transfers which reduce current utility by less than the expected di¤erence in lifetime utility between insurance and (partial or complete) autarky are feasible. Limited commitment models have been found to explain both inter-household (Coate and Ravallion, 1993 ; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002 ) and intra-household (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Wahhaj, 2007) behavior better than other models. Since the complete termination of the insurance relationship is not likely to be realistic for married couples, my assumption in this paper is that spouses limit rather than completely terminate the insurance relationship in case of non-payment.
I test for limited commitment by experimentally varying the intra-household correlation in the random income shocks that were paid out between three, randomly selected Treatment Groups. In Group 1, the correlation in the experimental shocks was 0.5; in Group 2, it was 0; and in Group 3, it was -0.5. Prior to the start of the experiment, these correlations were explained in lay language to respondents so that they understood the treatment. The intra-household correlations mean that the gains from insurance were higher in Groups 2 and 3 than in Group 1. If the limited commitment binds, then transfers should be higher in Groups 2 and 3 than in Group 1, a prediction which holds true for wives but not for husbands: women in Groups 2 and 3 transfer 39 and 44 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) more of the 150 Ksh shock, respectively, than do women in Group 1. In contrast, transfers from men to women do not respond to the treatment.
These results suggest that limited commitment is relevant within the household, at least for women, and that intra-household risk sharing is ine¢ cient at least in part because insurance partners cannot commit ex ante to e¢ cient resource allocation. That the limited commitment is binding for women but not for men is likely due to the fact that the income shocks were much larger, in relative terms, for women than for men, and so were more likely to cause a binding constraint.
The experimental design employed in this paper has several advantages over the empirical strategies employed in most existing studies of risk sharing or intra-household resource allocation. First, the experimental shocks are random so that the test for Pareto e¢ ciency is cleanly identi…ed. Second, the shocks are purely transitory and do not involve a permanent component.
While this distinction is not important under full insurance in which all risk is completely insured, permanent and transitory shocks might be treated very di¤erently if insurance contracts are subject to renegotiation. For instance, it might be the case that consumption shares can be renegotiated through a bargaining process, and that bargaining weights depend on permanent income. If so, a change in consumption due to a permanent change in relative income (holding total income …xed) may be consistent with e¢ ciency. 1 In contrast, purely transitory shocks which are small relative to lifetime income should have no e¤ect on the bargaining weight. Assuming that household members are risk averse, failing to insure these shocks would leave potential gains from trade unexploited, and would constitute a rejection of the collective model of the household developed by Chiappori and others (Chiappori, 1 Many studies have shown that household decisions are sensitive to ostensibly exogenous changes in relative intra-household incomes. Examples include Du ‡o (2003), Thomas (1990) Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Browning et al., 1994) ), which is based on the assumption that spouses have di¤erent preferences and bargain over outcomes, but that they achieve a Pareto e¢ cient outcome.
Generally, direct tests of intra-household risk sharing are rare, because they require data on individual-level income and consumption, which is not available in most datasets. Those studies that do exist cast some doubt on e¢ ciency. For instance, Goldstein (2004) rejects intrahousehold e¢ ciency for a sample of agricultural households in Ghana and …nds that individuals insure themselves through networks outside rather than within the household. Using individual consumption data from the Philippines, Dubois and Ligon (2005) reject the collective model. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) show that poor Ethiopian women bear the brunt of negative income shocks, in terms of reduced body mass. Du ‡o and Udry (2004) show that consumption patterns in the Cote D'Ivoire are sensitive to transitory relative income shocks caused by rainfall, which di¤erentially a¤ect male and female crops. These studies all echo the results of the vast majority of inter-household risk-sharing studies, which have consistently rejected e¢ ciency.
Third, since the shocks are experimentally generated, I am able to vary their intra-household correlation to test for limited commitment in a much simpler and more direct way than has previously been possible. In even the simplest static model (for instance, Coate and Ravallion (1993) ), limited commitment arrangements specify a transfer for every possible state of nature.
In more general dynamic models, transfers may also be history dependent so that they may serve a quasi-credit role whereby higher current consumption can be …nanced by higher future transfer commitments. Since sustainable transfers depend on a variety of factors that are di¢ cult to observe (including preferences, levels of risk aversion, rates of time discounting, and altruism), most tests have involved dynamic programming solutions that depend on assumptions about these factors (for instance, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002) .
Manipulating the correlation in the shocks experimentally presents a much more direct test of the theory.
Finally, this study is, to my knowledge, the …rst …eld experiment in risk sharing or intrahousehold resource allocation to observe real-world outcomes. Other studies have instead been 
Theoretical Framework
This section lays out a simple model of intra-household resource allocation in an intertemporal framework, and follows closely Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) . 2 To keep the notation simple, I assume that there is only one privately consumed good. The household's problem is to maximize a weighted sum of expected utilities:
subject to the budget constraint that
as well as non-negativity constraints on consumption. In this setup, m and f index the male and female, s 2 f1; ::; Sg index the state of nature, and the household is assumed to live for T periods. The discount rate is assumed to be the same for men and women. u m () and u f () represent utility functions, c I mst and c I f st represent consumption vectors under mutual insurance, represents the female's bargaining weight, and t represents information available at time t.
A mst and A f st represent male and female assets, respectively.
In keeping with the experimental design, I assume that s -the probability that state s occurs -and income realizations are not history dependent. However, consumption allocations are allowed to depend on the history of shocks received (h t ), which allows transfers to serve a quasi-credit role (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002) .
As written, equation (2) assumes that assets are pooled within the household. As is well known, the solution to the problem as written is to equate the ratio of male and female marginal utilities to the Pareto bargaining weight :
2 The section is also very similar to Wahhaj (2007) and Albarran and Attanasio (2003) .
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However, if the household is further constrained by a limited commitment constraint, achieving e¢ ciency may not be possible. After the state of nature is revealed and the contracted-upon transfer is speci…ed, an individual has the option to renege on his transfer obligation. In the absence of any punishment, a self-interested individual would always choose to renege, so non-zero transfers are only sustainable if his insurance partner punishes him for non-payment. Typically the punishment is thought of as consisting of two components: a moral or social cost P , and a partial or complete termination of the future insurance relationship. Though most studies assume that the insurance relationship is terminated completely in the case of non-payment, it does not seem reasonable in this context that spouses would completely terminate the relationship, so I assume instead that the insurance relationship is interrupted for w periods. 3 Denoting autarkic consumption at time t and state s as c A mst , the limited commitment participation constraint (for men) is that
An analogous condition applies to women. This constraint implies that current transfers must be low enough to make mutual insurance more attractive than w periods of autarky.
The solution to this problem is discussed in detail in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) .
What is important for my analysis is simply that, if the limited commitment constraint (4) does not bind, then optimality implies the well-known condition that the ratio of marginal utilities will be set equal to the Pareto weight , as in Equation (3). If, however, the limited commitment constraint is binding, unconstrained e¢ ciency will not be attainable. Instead, for the partner with the binding constraint, consumption must be set to satisfy (4).
Empirically, the test for unconstrained Pareto e¢ ciency will be performed by comparing changes in private consumption between weeks in which the husband receives the shock and weeks in which the wife receives the shock. Since these shocks are, by de…nition, transitory, the Permanent Income Hypothesis suggests that households should choose to intertemporally smooth their consumption and save the money (as has been tested in, for instance, Paxson (1992)). For this reason, it will only be possible to reject e¢ ciency if personal savings do not allow for complete intertemporal consumption smoothing. As such, the tests in this paper likely represent lower bounds on the amount of idiosyncratic risk which remains uninsured.
As will be described in more detail later, the experimental design described in this paper manipulates the potential gains from insurance by varying the intra-household correlation in the shocks that are received. The signi…cance of this is that potential gains from insurance are largest when incomes are negatively correlated, since it is relatively more likely that an individual who su¤ers a negative income shock will have a partner who receives a positive shock that can then be shared. If, however, incomes are strongly positively correlated, the scope for insurance is much more limited.
Empirically, this means that the limited commitment constraint is less likely to bind in treatments were income shocks are independent or negatively correlated, and more likely to bind when incomes are positively correlated. The implication is that higher transfers are sustainable when incomes are less correlated, which forms the basic test of this paper. 4 Finally, it should be noted that the test for unconstrained e¢ ciency is based on the assumption that small, transitory shocks should have no e¤ect on lifetime income and, hence, on Pareto bargaining weights, whereas the test for limited commitment is well speci…ed only to the extent that di¤erences in the correlation of the shocks will impact the limited commitment constraint through its e¤ect on the continuation value of insurance. Though these two requirements may seem at odds, they are compatible because I assume that the punishment for non-payment is to resort to autarky for w periods, rather than forever. This is ultimately an empirical matter:
if individuals punish a spouse's non-payment forever, the treatment will have no e¤ect on the limited commitment constraint and I will not observe any di¤erence in behavior between the various treatment groups. The towns targeted in this study are semi-urban areas located along a major highway from Nairobi, Kenya to Kampala, Uganda. Though many people in the area earn their living from agriculture, a substantial fraction earn at least some income from self-employment, as is common in the developing world (Banerjee and Du ‡o, 2007) . Many of these individuals work in town during the day but live in the surrounding rural areas. In the towns, the bodas are arranged in stages (which are similar to taxi stands), often at a speci…c landmark such as a big tree or near public transportation dropo¤ points along the highway. The same group of bodas will work from the same location every day, returning there after each fare. 5 The market women in this study sell vegetables and other foodstu¤s from a set location, often along the road.
Experimental Design
To recruit individuals into the study, a trained enumerator approached an individual at his place of work and asked to meet with him individually for a few minutes. The enumerator …rst asked the individual if he was married, and all those that were single were not interviewed further. 6 For those that were married, the enumerator then asked the respondent if he would be interested in participating in a project that would take approximately 8 weeks to complete, and that would require the administration of weekly monitoring surveys to both the respondent and his spouse. In particular, a precondition for participation was that the enumerator be allowed to visit the spouse at home without the primary respondent's supervision. Individuals were told that the weekly monitoring survey would take approximately 1 hour per week to complete, and that they would be compensated if they agreed to participate. If the individual was interested 5 The standard fare is 10 shillings ($0.14 US) per ride. 6 Several individuals lied about being married and were later dropped from the study.
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in the project, the enumerator took his name and contact information, and told him that we would return later to begin the project. The spouse's consent was obtained later, at the …rst monitoring interview.
Although we did not keep detailed records of those that refused to participate, attrition was low (approximately 10%). However, the sample is not necessarily representative of the population of married daily income earners in these areas. In particular, we were unlikely to …nd individuals that worked from town only occasionally, and instead were more likely to interview those working there regularly.
After enrolling in the study, each spouse was visited by one of ten trained enumerators once a week for approximately 8 weeks. Each week, the same enumerator visited both spouses and administered a detailed monitoring survey that included questions on consumption, expenditures, income (and income shocks), and labor supply over the previous 7 days. These surveys were conducted privately and con…dentially, and information was not shared with the spouse. 7 If one of the spouses could not be found on the day of the survey, the enumerator tried again for the next several days; if this individual was eventually traced, the enumerator asked about the same time period that was asked of the spouse (the 7 days prior to the scheduled meeting).
If the individual could not be traced that week, the spouse's survey was also dropped, so the analysis to be presented below includes only those weeks in which information is available for both spouses. At the conclusion of the project, each individual was administered a background questionnaire which included questions on access to credit and savings, asset ownership, and related issues.
To test for intra-household Pareto e¢ ciency, it is necessary to identify exogenous, transitory shocks to relative incomes. To cleanly identify such shocks, this project randomly provided 150
Kenyan shilling (about US $2) income shocks to participants. The probability of receiving the shock in a given week was 50% for all participants. To make the payment of the shocks as transparent as possible, each enumerator carried with him a black plastic bag containing 56 slips of paper with the numbers 1-56 on them. Each number corresponded to a payment for both spouses. For each spouse, the drawing of 28 of the slips resulted in payment, while the drawing 7 In most cases, the primary respondent was interviewed at work and the spouse at home.
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of the other 28 resulted in no payment. The shocks were announced to each spouse, so that each knew what the other had gotten. Payments were made privately, however, and individuals were told that they could spend the money however they chose.
This experimental design has several advantages. First, the shocks are big relative to incomes in the area, equivalent to approximately 1.5 days'income for men and 7 days'income for women ( Table 2 , Panel A). Second, since the shocks were publicly observable (unlike many real-world shocks, which are usually only partially observable), any observed ine¢ ciency is not attributable to the information available to the spouse, so that comparing the responsiveness of private consumption to own and spouse's income shocks represents a direct test of Pareto e¢ ciency.
Third, through the data collected with the monitoring surveys, it is possible to compare the experimental results with real world responses to ‡uctuations in weekly labor income.
One disadvantage of the study, however, is that (for ethical and practical reasons) the income shocks provided were always positive, unlike real-world shocks which can of course be either The other primary purpose of the …eld experiment is to test for intra-household limited commitment by experimentally manipulating the continuation value of the insurance relationship. As discussed above, the experiment is based on the fact that the value of an insurance relationship is the expected utility gain from insurance, relative to autarky. Since the potential gains from insurance are higher the less correlated are partner incomes (since partners are more likely to be able to make transfers to each other when negative shocks occur), the presence of a binding limited commitment constraint predicts that higher transfers are sustainable if incomes are independent or negatively correlated.
To test this implication, the sample was split into 3 groups with varying correlation in the probability of receiving the 150 Kenyan shilling income shocks. 8 In Group 1, the correlation was 0.5; in group 2, the correlation was 0; and in Group 3, the correlation was -0.5. The payment schedule that the enumerators carried re ‡ected these correlations.
For the treatment to be meaningful, individuals must know and understand the correlation in the shocks, a task made somewhat di¢ cult by the average level of education in this sample, which is 7.72 years for men and 7.02 years for women (Table 1) . To ensure comprehension, each enumerator read from a prepared script which made no speci…c mention of correlations but emphasized instead the probability that both the respondent and his spouse would either both receive or both not receive the shock. 9 These probabilities were presented both as speci…c percentages or odds (i.e., 75% or 3/4), and as general likelihoods (i.e., "more than half the time").
At the end of the script, individuals answered questions about the various probabilities, and any misunderstandings were discussed. A shorter script and follow-up comprehension questionnaire were later administered during the course of the experiment. In general, individuals seemed to understand the setup. Panel C presents statistics on asset ownership. Though assets are primarily controlled by the male, females do hold assets as well. On average, men own 0.79 acres of land, compared to 0.15 acres for women. 13 Similarly, women control a total of a bit less than 950 Ksh (US $14) worth of animals and other durable goods, compared to more than 5,600 Ksh (US $80) for men. 14 1 2 Many of these individuals live in family compounds, in which each adult couple has their own dwelling but the distinction between di¤erent households in the same compound might not be very sharp. 1 3 The per acre value of land controlled by women appears to be much lower than that of men. However, since these …gures are self-reports, they should be taken with some caution. 1 4 Durable goods include beds, sofas, tables, chairs, cookers, radios, TVs, mobile and landline phones, clocks, watches, sewing machines, irons, bicycles, and bednets. 12 Table 2 footnote). In relative terms, then, the experimental income shocks are very large, especially for women: the $2 shock is equivalent to roughly 1.5 days' income for men and over a week's income for women. To put this in terms of a developed country equivalent, for men, the shock is equivalent to roughly $200 for a worker making $50,000 per year. For women, the shock is much larger, equivalent to roughly $950.
Overview of Monitoring Data
Though I have collected data on both consumption and expenditures, I will focus on expenditures throughout the paper, for several reasons. First, to reduce the length of the monitoring survey, the consumption questions were asked only at the household level so that I do not have speci…c measures of individual consumption shares: the only additional information that the consumption data provides is household in-kind saving or dissaving over periods (which was in fact small) or household consumption of own-farm produce. Second, the test of e¢ ciency employed in this paper concerns the consumption of private goods (alcohol, cigarettes, soda, clothing and shoes, hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, own meals in restaurants, transportation and various other items), and expenditures on these items are equal to consumption in most cases. This is because individual consumption should di¤er from individual expenditures only if a share of the expenditure was allocated to another household member, or if individuals saved a portion of the expenditure for future consumption or consumed expenditures that had been saved in a previous period (for example, by consuming maize that had been purchased the week before). However, expenditures that were allocated to another individual were recorded as in-kind transfers in the monitoring survey, so that all amounts that I quantify as individual expenditures were eventually consumed by the given individual. Also, though certain private items could in principle be saved for future use (such as cigarettes or bottled beer), in practice these were consumed immediately. Omitting the state index s for simplicity (and because the set of possible experimental states is described completely by the combination of the shocks that are received), I will run a reduced form speci…cation (for each consumption category), as follows:
Panel B of
where the dependent variable c it is private expenditures. To remove the unobserved individual error term i , I estimate the equation by …xed e¤ects. I control for time e¤ects t by including indicators for the week of the interview. The standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level.
The test of Pareto e¢ ciency is simply that the shocks only a¤ect private expenditures through their e¤ect on the budget constraint, or that:
As noted previously, if the household behaves in accordance with the Permanent Income Hypothesis, the shocks will be saved and private consumption will not be sensitive to the shocks whatsoever. Thus, it will be impossible to reject e¢ ciency if the shocks are entirely saved.
The transitory nature of the shocks also means that the test proposed here is not a test of income pooling, but a test of whether the shocks to income are pooled (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).
Testing the Model: Individual Data
The results from estimating the reduced form speci…cation (5) by …xed e¤ects are presented in Panels A (for the male) and B (for the female) in Table 3 . 16 The dependent variables in this Panel B indicates, however, that women do not spend the experimental shock as men do.
Column 3 of Panel B shows there is no change in female private expenditures in weeks in which she receives the shock. The only change in the overall pattern of female expenditures is an increase in medical expenditures, which may re ‡ect female preferences but which may also represent female contributions to shared household expenses. Finally (and strangely), women appear to spend more money on animals or construction when a shock is received by her spouse than when she herself receives a shock, though the e¤ect is small.
Panel C shows the e¤ect of the shock on savings in ROSCAs, total savings 18 and transfers.
It appears from Panel C that the majority of the shock is saved: men save 88.1% of the shock, women save 57.4%. Note that the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) predicts that the entire shock should be saved, so that the marginal propensity to save out of the shock should be 1.
Given the relatively large standard errors from these estimates, I cannot reject the PIH for either spouse.
Interestingly, men do not seem to share much or any of the shock with their spouse in the form of transfers. Men send 7.7% of the shock to their wife (and 5.2% outside the household), though both e¤ects are statistically insigni…cant. Women, by contrast, send 16.2% of the shock (about 24 shillings) to their husbands (signi…cant at 1%), and 8.6% (statistically insigni…cant) outside the household.
One issue that I cannot explore with my data is whether savings of the experimental shocks are pooled within the household or held individually. From Table 4 , women appear to invest part of the money into their own Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, which are typically individually controlled. It has been argued that ROSCA savings are a way for women to save up for durable goods (Anderson and Baland, 2002) . Similarly, it is entirely possible that informal savings ("under the mattress") are privately rather than jointly controlled. If so, these savings responses may in themselves be violations of the strongest form of intra-household e¢ ciency, though I cannot adequately address these issues here. However, it remains possible that women as well as men do not fully share the experimental shock.
Household Data
One additional test of Pareto e¢ ciency is that the total household propensity to save out of male and female income should be equal. This prediction is tested using an Instrumental Variables speci…cation, in which individual male and female incomes are instrumented with the shock. do not reject e¢ ciency in regards to savings. In addition, both propensities are indistinguishable from 1, in line with the PIH.
6 Limited Commitment
Empirical Methodology
As the results in the previous section represent a rejection of Pareto e¢ ciency, the remainder of the paper will test whether limited commitment might serve as a partial explanation for the results. Ideally, this test would focus on private expenditures. However, expenditures are measured somewhat imprecisely in my data, so I will instead focus mainly on observed transfers (however, I will also present expenditure results). The basic test will be of the form
where G 2i and G 3i are indicators for Groups 2 and 3, respectively. Simple risk sharing will imply that 1 , 2 , and 3 are all > 0 and that 1 , 2 , and 3 are < 0 (however, note that men did not transfer any of the shock to their wives). Under limited commitment, an additional prediction is that 3 > 2 > 1 and 3 < 2 < 1 .
Since the empirical methodology utilized here is conditional on the shocks, the test of limited commitment is whether -given the exact same set of shocks -households in which experimental incomes are less correlated transfer more than households where experimental incomes are more correlated. If the test were not conditional on the shocks, a spurious correlation would likely appear: since households in, for instance, Group 3 are more likely to be in opposite states of nature than households in Group 1, they will tend to send transfers more regularly. However, conditional on the same realization of shocks, transfers should not di¤er.
Testing for Limited Commitment

Checking Randomization
As discussed in the experimental design section, the sample was randomly divided into 3 Treatment Groups. However, the randomization was done before collecting the background data, so it was impossible to stratify by background characteristics, which means that there might exist di¤erences between groups. Table 5 presents baseline di¤erences between the Treatment Groups, along with an F-test for joint equality of the 3 means. The standard errors are clustered by couple.
There are 33 outcomes in Table 5 , several of which signi…cantly di¤er between Groups at the 5% level: the proportion that is Protestant, the proportion that knows a divorced friend or family member, and the proportions that believe that the stigma from divorce and separation are "not at all negative." These small di¤erences appear to be due to random chance, and suggest that there do not exist signi…cant pre-program di¤erences between the Treatment Groups. 19 In addition, all experimental results are estimated by …xed e¤ects, so that mean di¤erences due to background variables will be di¤erenced out -the coe¢ cients will be biased only if there are interaction e¤ects between pre-treatment di¤erences and the experimental shocks that are not captured by the …xed e¤ects. between Groups 1 and 3, and Groups 1 and 2. However, I cannot reject the null between Groups 2 and 3, due in large part to the relatively low power of the dataset. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with the presence of a limited commitment constraint for women.
Experimental Evidence
There is, however, no experimental evidence of limited commitment among men in this study.
From Panel B, there are no di¤erence in transfer behavior in any of the three Treatment Groups.
In fact, transfers do not signi…cantly di¤er from zero in any of the 3 Groups. Though the results in the previous section suggest that male private expenditures are sensitive to the shock, and that they do not share the experimental shock with their spouses, the results in this Table   imply that limited commitment is not the explanation for this behavior. A likely explanation for the fact that the constraint doesn't bind for men is that the shocks are too small to cause the constraint to bind.
Appendix Table 2 explores the e¤ect of the experimental treatment on savings and other expenditure categories and presents p-values for tests of equality between the various combinations of interactions. The only di¤erences which are signi…cant at 10% are female shared expenditures, male total expenditures, and male savings. Again, it is di¢ cult to make much of this given the noisiness in these measures.
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History Dependence
As discussed previously, limited commitment models may be either static or dynamic. The key di¤erence between these two is that a dynamic system allows for history dependence, while static models specify a set of transfers that are state-but not history-dependent. History dependence allows transfers to serve a quasi-credit role, in which higher transfers in the present can be exchanged for lower future transfers.
I will test for history dependence by running a reduced form …xed e¤ects regression of the
I will use several speci…cations for the history h it : the overall sum of shocks received (
the shock from the previous period (S it 1 ), and the sum of shocks from the previous 2 periods (S it 1 + S it 2 ). Table 7 presents the reduced form estimates of Equation (8) Taken jointly, the results in these Tables suggest that limited commitment is relevant for women. In the next section, I will discuss various alternative interpretations of the results and present further evidence in favor of the argument that limited commitment is the explanation for the observed results.
Discussion
The preceding section raise several questions which I will attempt to address in this section.
In particular, I focus on three important issues. First, are these results subject to alternative explanations such as di¤erential levels of risk aversion between spouses? Second, are the results externally valid? Third, limited commitment would suggest that the gains to insurance were much lower towards the end of the experiment. Given this, how did transfers compare at the beginning and end of the experiment?
Di¤erential Preferences Between Men and Women
The tests utilized in this paper assume that husbands and wives have identical risk preferences.
If they do not, it is not e¢ cient for the spouses to pool all idiosyncratic risk; instead, it is optimal for the least risk averse partner to accept some idiosyncratic risk while his partner is insured (Mazzocco and Saini, 2007) . Empirically, it has been repeatedly shown that men tend to be less risk averse than women (Croson and Gneezy, 2004) , which would imply that the results in Table 4 are not necessarily incompatible with e¢ ciency. I will address this question directly by making use of experimentally elicited measures of risk aversion that were collected during the course of the experiment.
In particular, I elicited risk preference from both spouses by asking them several risk aversion questions. The questions follow Charness and Genicot (2004) and ask individuals how much they would like to invest in an asset which pays o¤ 2.5 times what is invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5. To incentivize respondents, they were told that one of the questions would be randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. After the experiment ended, a question was randomly picked, each respondent was given the amount that he decided to keep, and a coin was ‡ipped to determine if the amount invested would be multiplied by 2.5 or would be lost.
Gender di¤erences in risk aversion are presented in Table 8 , Panel A. On average, men do invest approximately 10% more in the risky investment and so appear to be less risk averse than women, though this di¤erence is statistically insigni…cant. As a …rst pass, these di¤erences do not appear large enough to generate the entire observed di¤erence in behavior, but I will 22 examine this in more detail below.
A similar preference-based explanation for the result that women transfer some of the shock to their husbands but men do not transfer much to their wives is that women are more altruistic than men and derive more utility from their husbands' consumption than men do from their wives'. To examine this possibility, I elicited preferences for altruism by asking each individual to play a dictator game with their spouse. Individuals were asked to divide a sum of money between themselves and their spouse, and truth telling was again ensured by randomly picking one of their responses for payment. By necessity, the choices made by individuals were known by their spouses. Respondents were also asked to divide a sum between themselves and an anonymous stranger, but these choices were not actually paid out at the end of the experiment so the incentives to truth tell were limited. However, responses to both sets of questions were highly correlated.
Gender di¤erences in altruism are presented in Table 8 , Panel B. Interestingly, men give more in the dictator game than do women (this is in contrast to the studies surveyed in Croson and Gneezy, 2004) . This result holds both in choices for anonymous strangers and for the spouse.
This counter-intuitive result may not necessarily re ‡ect inherent altruistic preferences, however.
The amounts to be divided were very large in size for women (amounting to approximately 33%-100% of the average women's weekly wage), but much smaller for men due to their larger incomes, so these di¤erences may simply re ‡ect declining marginal utility of income. Regardless, since the weekly shocks were of similar sizes as these dictator payments, it appears that altruism is not a likely explanation.
To explore these issues more formally, I re-run Equation (5) for spouses with similar preferences on the risk aversion and dictator games in Appendix Table 3 . In particular, I restrict these regressions to couples with di¤erences of no greater than 10 Ksh in the share of 100 Ksh that was invested in the risky asset, or di¤erences of no greater than 10 Ksh in the amount given to the spouse in the 100 Ksh dictator game. Ninety-…ve of the 142 couples (67%) qualify for the risk aversion regression, and 85 (65%) quality for the altruism regression. It is apparent from Appendix Table 3 that these couples behave similarly to the rest of the sample: women but not men transfer money to their spouses, and men but not women increase their private expenditures in response to the shocks. Given this, it seems fair to conclude that di¤erential preferences are not the explanation for the results found in this paper.
External Validity
Concerns may also be raised regarding the external validity of this study, on several fronts.
First, since the experimental shocks here are always positive but real-world shocks can be either positive or negative, it may be that behavior here is not completely realistic. While it is di¢ cult to completely alleviate this concern, several behavioral results suggest that such a bias would tend to bias my results towards zero. In particular, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , among others, have noted that individuals tend to be risk loving over losses but risk averse over gains.
If so, people should be more likely to insure gains than losses, which would imply that my estimates of the responsiveness of male private consumption to the experimental shocks would be a lower bound on the true e¤ect.
A separate and perhaps more serious concern is that the experimental treatment described in this paper was seen as a game by these couples, and that they behaved di¤erently in the game than they would have if the shocks had been real. This issue could be at least partially addressed if it were possible to identify real-world idiosyncratic income shocks that a¤ect individual income (for instance, health shocks). Unfortunately, my measures of health and other shocks are too weak for such an exercise.
Instead, I examine the e¤ect of week-to-week ‡uctuations in individual labor income on transfers, savings, and expenditures. Though labor supply and income are clearly not exogenous, this approach is valid if it can be assumed that permanent income is constant for the 8 weeks in which couples were followed, and that any deviation between income in a given week and average weekly income is exogenous. While this assumption may be subject to criticism, it is hopefully reasonable enough for my purpose here.
The results are presented in Table 9 . Just as in the experimental results section, Panels A and B present expenditures and Panel C presents savings. In general, labor income ‡uctuations appears to be spent similarly to the experimental shocks. For both men and women, increases in own income are associated with increases in total expenditures and shared expenditures, as 24 spouses contribute more towards household expenditures in weeks in which they make a larger share of household income. The more immediately relevant result is that both male and female expenditures are increasing in own income (though the increase for women is not quite signi…cant at 10%), but not in the spouse's income (Column 3). For men, this increase comes primarily from meals in restaurants 21 and from other private items; for women, the increase comes largely from spending on clothing. These results lend additional support to the notion that idiosyncratic risk is not pooled, and also suggest that women may also keep some idiosyncratic income for themselves.
The propensity to save out of current labor income is high: the estimated propensity 0.726 for men and 0.796 for women (Panel C), both of which are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1. If labor income were truly exogenous, this represents a rejection of the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
This is similar to the experimental results in Table 3 (though, in that case, those estimates were not signi…cantly di¤erent from 1, due to the large standard errors). Interestingly, transfers within the household (for either spouse) do not respond signi…cantly to changes in relative incomes, but transfers outside the household do. This is similar to the results in Goldstein (2004) , who found that agricultural couples receive insurance from outside the household, but that withinhousehold insurance is limited. This …nding, which con ‡icts with the female transfers observed experimentally, constitutes the one major di¤erence between the experimental and real-world shocks. Aside from that, the results in this Table are largely consistent with the experimental results.
I further test whether the results are consistent with limited commitment by examining how the amount of risk that is shared varies with background characteristics of the spouses. Under limited commitment, risk sharing should be more limited for individuals for whom the utility loss from autarky is small. For instance, we might expect that risk sharing would be limited for individuals with more assets or for individuals with better access to formal or informal credit.
I examine these possibilities in Table 10 . In this Table, I interact the shocks with background 2 1 Note that the e¤ect of male income on meals in restaurants need not be causal. Since most men in the sample work away from home, they tend to eat lunch at restaurants when they are working, so that meals in restaurants and labor income may be spuriously correlated through labor supply. However, the relationship holds even when controlling for hours spent working, so that this does not appear to be the only explanation for the result.
characteristics. 22 Panels A and B present results for females and males, respectively. In the Table, I interact the shocks with levels of asset ownership, access to informal credit through friends and family, and with indicators for whether the respondent reports being able to make independent …nancial decisions. All questions on asset ownership and access to loans are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
From Panel A, all of these interactions have the expected negative sign, though only the interaction with the amount saved in a ROSCA is signi…cant at 10%. That ROSCA participation seems to a¤ect the limited commitment constraint suggests that the guaranteed income that ROSCAs provide has a signi…cant impact on female autarkic utility. It is of course very di¢ cult to rule out the possibility that this interaction re ‡ects other unobserved di¤erences between women that participate in ROSCAs and women that do not, though the results are suggestive.
Similar results are found for men in Panel B. In particular, men with larger land holdings transfer less of the shock to their wives. However, the sign of these coe¢ cients are less clear than for women, perhaps because the 150 Ksh were too small to a¤ect the limited commitment constraint for men. In fact, the coe¢ cients on the interactions for loans given and received and on the amount saved in ROSCAs are actually positive.
Behavior Towards the End of the Experiment
The test of limited commitment utilized in this paper requires that the shocks a¤ect the value of insurance relative to autarky. As the experiment approached its conclusion, however, the correlation in the shocks should not have much a¤ected behavior. For this reason, a …nal test of the limited commitment model is to compare behavior in the last few periods to behavior earlier on.
To this end, I separately examine transfers (again, from the female to the male) in the …nal 2 weeks of the experiment and in earlier weeks, in Appendix Table 4 . Excluding the …nal 2 weeks, women in Group 1 transfer 0.058 of the shock to their husbands, while women in Groups By contrast, in the …nal 2 weeks, women in Groups 2 and 3 transfer only 0.072 and 0.113 of the shock. Both of these latter estimates are insigni…cantly di¤erent from 0, though the small sample size and large standard errors make it impossible to reject the hypothesis that these estimates are equal to those in the earlier periods. Of course, since the standard errors of both estimates are large due to the reduced sample size, these estimates should be interpreted with some care. Nonetheless, it does appear that transfers were higher earlier in the experiment, in agreement with the hypothesis that limited commitment is the primary explanation for the di¤erential behavior between the 3 Groups.
Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence that suggests that intra-household risk-sharing arrangements in Kenya are ine¢ cient and that limited commitment may be a partial explanation for that ine¢ ciency. Employing the results of a …eld experiment conducted among a sample of 142 daily income earners and their spouses, in which each individual received 150 Kenyan shilling income shocks with 50% probability, I have shown that men increase their private consumption in response to transitory income shocks, a violation of Pareto e¢ ciency. While this is in line with a number of other studies that reject the unitary household model, the …nding that male consumption is responsive to even a transitory income shock is also a rejection of the more general collective model.
To test whether limited commitment is a partial explanation for these results, I randomly split the sample into 3 Treatment Groups, between which the within-couple correlation in experimental payments was varied. As the continuation value of the insurance partnership is greatest when incomes are least correlated, limited commitment models would predict that transfers would be highest and risk sharing would be most e¤ective in the Groups with least correlation.
Indeed, I …nd that women make signi…cantly higher transfers when incomes are less or negatively correlated, suggesting that limited commitment is a constraint on risk sharing.
In demonstrating the importance of limited commitment, this paper contributes to a substantial intra-household risk-sharing literature. Interest in this …eld is generated partly because insurance within a single household is likely to su¤er less from the information and enforcement 27 problems that exist in inter-household insurance arrangements, and because married couples in developing countries should have an incentive to insure each other because of the lack of alternative risk-sharing mechanisms. Given this, many have argued that, if e¢ cient insurance is to be found anywhere, it is to be found within the household. This paper suggests that it is not to be found anywhere: just like any other insurance system with incomplete contracts, the self-interest of insurance partners limits the e¤ectiveness of the system. Married or not, individuals that …nd themselves in a favorable state relative to their partner always have an incentive to reduce transfers below their Pareto e¢ cient levels, making full insurance di¢ cult.
Future work may explore the role of preferences for reciprocity or fairness in informal risksharing arrangements. In particular, the standard limited commitment model predicts that individuals resort to autarky as a punishment for non-payment. At a more basic level, this punishment strategy likely re ‡ects an inherent preference for fairness or for reciprocity, and such preferences likely form the underpinning of the punishment which makes more than a minimal level of risk-sharing possible. Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock. The main test of Pareto efficiency is Column 3 in Panels A and B, which shows the effect of the shocks on private expenditures. In Panels A and B, The "total shared" category includes Columns 4 and 5: shared food (all food consumed jointly at home), and "other shared," which includes cleaning supplies, rent, water, other household bills, and other shared household items. The "total private" category includes Columns 8-10 (clothing and shoes, meals in restaurants, and other private), as well as other categories, including alcohol, soda, cigarettes, hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, and transportation. Column 10 (other private) includes transportation, bicycle expenditures, personal hygiene products, and other private items such as airtime for mobile phones. Total expenditures equal the sum of total shared, total private, items for children, medical, animals & construction, and charity. The dependent variables in Panel C are individual savings and transfers for men (Columns 1-4) and women (Columns 5-8). Transfers are defined as positive for outflows and negative for inflows. Savings are defined as the sum of total income (including the experimental shocks), transfers, and bank and ROSCA flows minus total expenditures. See Tables 4 and A1 for the effect of the shocks on labor supply. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are individual expenditures by men and women, respectively. Total income is the sum of labor income and the experimental shock, if it was received. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Investment in Panel A is the amount put into an investment that pays off 2.5 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5. The choices to an anonymous stranger were not actually paid out, whereas one of the responses for the amount given to the spouse were. See text for details. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Amt. Given to Anonymous Stranger^Amt. Given to Spouse Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are individual expenditures by men and women, respectively. See Table 3 for description of categories.
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